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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

EXXON CORPORATION;
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; and
MOBIL EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION,

Case No. 20081017-SC

Petitioners,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE UINTAH BASIN REVITALIZATION
FUND AND NAVAJO REVITALIZATION FUND IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT

BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund and Navajo Revitalization Fund
have filed, concurrently with this Brief in Support of Respondent, a Motion for Leave to
File an Amicus Brief and a Memorandum in Support of the Motion.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Amici Funds believe that the decision of this Court to prospectively apply it's
holding in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Common, 2003 UT 53, 86 P.3d 706 was
correct. In this appeal Petitioners assert that such selectively prospective application of the
holding was in error. Amici's position is that such an application not only was, but
remains, appropriate and urge that the Court not change it course in this appeal.

Status of this Issue: The issue of whether or not this Court erred in applying it's holding in
ExxonMobil prospectively was not considered by the Commission but only raised by the
Petitioner's in this appeal of the decision by the Commission to deny it's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund and the Navajo Revitalization Fund (the
"Funds") are both "enterprise funds/' operating under the oversight of the Division of
Housing and Community Development of the Utah Department of Community and
Culture. They were created by the Utah Legislature in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 9-10-101 to 108 and 9-11-101 to 108 (West 2004). For the purpose of
demonstrating the vital interest of these two funds in the matters which are the subject of
this appeal, a brief description of the circumstances which gave rise to the two funds and
the way that they operate is necessary.
History
In 1994 protracted litigation concerning the jurisdictional status of land within the
Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation in Northeastern Utah was in its final stages. With
the principal jurisdictional issues having been judicially resolved, the State, the Ute Indian
Tribe and the Counties of Duchesne and Uintah entered into negotiations in an effort to
settle a number of outstanding issues, including hunting and fishing (wildlife
conservation) rights; arrest authority (including the cross-deputization of law enforcement
officers); questions of civil-regulatory authority; water rights; environmental regulation;
the status of rights of way crossing tribal land; and a number of taxation issues.
2

One issue was particularly pressing and was dealt with at an early stage of the
negotiations. The Tribal Business Committee of the Ute Indian Tribe had passed an
ordinance authorizing, and it was in the process of implementing, a Business Activity Fee
applying to non-Indian persons and companies doing business on Tribal trust land. Under
the approved ordinance affected persons and companies would have been required to
obtain a license and pay a fee in the amount of 6% of the gross receipts from their business
activity.
Potentially affected individuals and companies were very concerned about the
likely impact of the proposed Business Activity Fee, and the State felt that it might
significantly impact business activity in the area. Because of these concerns the State
entered into negotiations with the Tribe seeking to avoid imposition of the Business
Activity Fee.
The result of the negotiations was an agreement to jointly support legislation which
would divert a portion of severance taxes collected by the State from oil and gas
production on Tribal trust lands to a fund dedicated to supporting revitalization projects on
the reservation and in the surrounding area. The legislation passed in 1995, the fund was
established, and it has been operating as intended since that time. As indicated above, the
creation of the fund was a specific trade-off for an agreement on the part of the Ute Indian
Tribe not to impose its Business Activity Fee. Section 9-10-108(1) provides specifically
that the diversion of State severance tax income into the fund is dependent upon "no
business or activity fee or tax based upon gross receipts [being] imposed by a county or the
Tribe."
3

Following passage of the legislation establishing the Uintah Basin Revitalization
Fund, negotiations were conducted with the Navajo Nation with respect to the possibility
of establishing a similar fiind through the diversion of a portion of severance taxes
collected by the State from oil and gas production on Navajo trust land. Here again, the
negotiations were conducted in the broad context of government-to-government relations
between the State and the Navajo Nation, with a variety of other issues being discussed at
the same time. Agreement was reached on the establishment of a Hind patterned after the
one operating in the Uintah Basin. The willingness of the State to agree to a diversion of
severance taxes was in return for concessions made by the Navajo Nation on other issues
and was in line with the general policy of the State to be even-handed in its dealings with
Indian tribes.
In 1996 legislation was passed creating the Navajo Revitalization Fund to support
revitalization projects on the Utah portion of the Navajo Reservation. Section 9-11-101 et
seq. The fund has been operating as intended since that time.
Nature of the Funds and Projects Financed Thereby
The two revitalization funds operate similarly, under the direction of separate
boards composed of representatives of the State, the Indian tribe and the county(ies)
involved. The two boards have the authority to direct the disbursement of amounts in the
funds to projects meeting the established criteria in the form of grants or loans. Sections
9-10-i04(i)(a) and 9-1 l-106(l)(a). Attached as an Addendum to Amici's 2003 brief was
a list of the amounts received and expended by the two funds over the years that they had
been operating and some details on the projects financed. In many cases the amounts from
4

the revitalization funds have been matched with monies from governmental, tribal or other
sources to finance projects too large to be financed by a single funding source.
The amounts received by the two funds have generally been expended as they have
been received and any remaining, unexpended balances have been committed to approved
projects which are either in the planning stages or under construction.
In the ExxonMobil case, Amici explained the anticipated impact should the Court
decide to change the interpretation of the statute and apply a new interpretation
retroactively. The impacts enunciated by Amici in 2003, were:
1.

The inability of the Amici Funds to refund the expended or committed

severance taxes that they had received in connection with a refund ordered as part of a
decision changing the interpretation of the severance tax statute and giving the decision
retroactive application.
2.

The adverse political consequences a decision reducing tax collections

would have by changing the basis on which severance taxes are calculated thereby
reducing the amount going into the two funds and consequently the amount available to
finance projects on the two Indian reservations. The establishment of the two Amici
Revitalization Funds and the expectation that they would receive a certain level of funding
from the diversion of severance taxes pursuant to the statutory formula was part of
negotiated settlements between the State of Utah, the Ute Indian Tribe, the Navajo Nation
and three Utah counties. To change the formula on which the negotiation calculations
were premised could result in:

5

a.

The Indian people considering this as another example of having been given
promises which were notfillfilled;

b.

The Utes proceeding to implement their proposed, economically damaging
Business Activity Fee; and,

c.

The Navajos taking the position that they are no longer bound by negotiated
concessions that they made.

There remains a very real potential that above-noted consequences could be
realized in the future should the revenues derived by the Amici Funds be insufficient to
finance the necessary programs and projects anticipated by the Indian people during their
negotiations with the State.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The anticipated impacts indicated by Amici in the 2003 case before this Court were
not imaginary nor were they inflated or exaggerated. The 2003 representation by Amici of
the impact to the Amici Funds had the Court applied a changed interpretation of the statute
retroactively was valid and correct at the time it was made. A decision by the Court
accepting the view of the interpretation of the key statute urged by the Appellant therein
and the Petitioner herein, would have an impact upon the finances of the State and, if the
decision had been applied retroactively, potentially a catastrophic impact upon the two
Funds filing their brief as Amici in 2003, and herein. Severance taxes collected by the
State constitute an important component of the revenue relied upon by the State and 100%
of the revenue of Amici, two funds established to finance deserving projects on or close to
the Ute and Navajo Indian Reservations.
6

A decision changing the interpretation of the statute retroactively would have given
all oil companies a basis for seeking refunds of previously paid taxes. The Amici Funds
would not have been capable of refunding taxes received and spent or committed as part of
their ongoing, beneficial work. It was essential that any change in the interpretation of the
statute be limited to prospective application to avoid the creation of an impossible
situation.
The well-established common law of this State provides a solid basis for limiting
any such decision to prospective application and this Court was correct to limit it's holding
to a prospective application.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
LIMITATION ADOPTED IN EXXONMOBIL.
Over a period of thirty years this Court has consistently approved giving only

prospective effect to decisions invalidating or changing the interpretation of a statute
where parties would be adversely affected by making the decision retroactive. Van Dyke
v. Chappell 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991); Timpanogos Planning and Water Mgmt. Agency
v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984); Board of Educ. of
the Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983); Loval Order of
Moose, #259 v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah
1982); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972).
In the case of Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), this
Court first used the approach of "selective prospectivity" where the decision is applied to
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the parties before the court but not to other parties whose claims or defenses arose prior to
the decision changing the law. In Rio Algom the Court invalidated a property tax statute
on constitutional grounds. The decision was applied retroactively to the six plaintiffs in
the case and prospectively as to all other taxpayers. Such an approach was held to violate
no right under the United States Constitution and to be justified by any of the following
circumstances:
1.

To avoid imposing a financial or administrative burden on local units of
government, Id. at 195;

2.

To preserve the financial solvency of local government units, Id. at 196; or

3.

Where there has been reliance. Id.

The 1991 U.S. Supreme Court case of James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.
501 U.S. 529 (1991) (superseded by statute on other grounds), recognized that equitable
considerations may be taken into account in deciding whether to apply decisions
retroactively. These equitable considerations include whether there has been substantial
reliance on the prior state of the law, whether persons other than the litigants might receive
a windfall, and whether, in tax cases, a state might be heavily penalized by having to make
reftmds as a result of the retroactive application of a decision.
Beam left the door open for states to limit the availability of refunds in tax cases
and two years after Beam this Court issued Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 862
P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993), in which a taxpayer sought a refund of property taxes paid under
protest based upon the Rio Algom invalidation of the statute under which they were
collected. This Court denied the claim for a refund, holding specifically that the Rio
8

Algom decision barred all claims which arose prior to the decision's operable date.
Kennecott Corp., 862 P.2d at 1350. The taxpayer argued that the Beam decision of the
United States Supreme Court precluded the use of "selective prospectivity" in tax cases.
Id. at 1351. This Court carefully analyzed the Beam decision and concluded that it left to
the states the question of whether to apply law-changing decisions retroactively or
prospectively. I d It then proceeded to reaffirm its prior determination that, in cases
where there has been reliance upon the presumed validity of prior law and the retroactive
application of a decision would impose a burden, the Court may order that a decision apply
only prospectively. I d at 1352. Kennecott is important because in it this Court had an
opportunity, in light of Beam, to depart from its time-honored willingness to limit
decisions to prospective application if the circumstances of the case suggest that doing so
would be the fairest way of proceeding. It declined to do so and again upheld the use of
selective prospectivity.
The pre ExxonMobil decision of this Court dealing with the question of how to
apply decisions overruling prior authority was the 1999 case of Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Common, 979 P.2d 346 (Utah 1999). In that case
the Court overturned a rule of the Tax Commission dealing with the apportionment of
taxes assessed against the property of commercial airlines. The Court concluded its
decision with the following ruling:
Because retroactive application of our holding in this particular
case could potentially create substantial disruption and chaos
relating to tax revenues already collected and disbursed, our
ruling shall be prospective only from the date it issues.

9

WL at 357 (citing c.f., Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake County Common, 749 P.2d 1264, 126768 (Utah 1988)).
IL

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE SUPPORT THE COURT'S
PRIOR DECISION TO APPLY IT'S HOLDING IN EXXONMOBIL IN A
SELECTIVELY PROSPECTIVE MANNER.
A.

The Policy Considerations Recognized By This Court in
ExxonMobil Were Valid and the Conclusion that
Prospective Relief was Warranted was not Reversible
Error.

The practical question existed in 2003, and still exists in 2009, of whether the
Court's decision regarding the interpretation of the statute, if applied without the
prospective limitation, would open the door to claims by taxpayers for a refund of taxes
collected prior to its decision. The concerns Amici presented in their brief and argument
before the Court in the prior ExxonMobil matter were not exaggerated but were real and
based upon the known facts at the time; refund requests had been filed which ranged from
50% to 100% of the taxes that had been paid. Reductions of monies collected in this
magnitude would have, and still will have, the potential to negatively impact the
commitments made by the Amici Funds for ongoing projects.
Opening that door in 2003, or in 2009, could arguably: (1) provide an unexpected
windfall for oil and gas producers; (2) result in a very troublesome revenue drain to the
State at a time of strained budgets and finances; and (3) create an impossible situation for
the Amici, since severance tax revenue distributed to them has been expended and is not
available to be refunded.
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A number of considerations have been listed by this Court in its decisions over the
years that are to be weighed in deciding whether to limit a decision to prospective
application. All of the considerations were satisfied by the facts in ExxonMobil. Those
considerations and the attendant facts presented to this Court in ExxonMobil were;
lL

Have commitments been made and government planning been conducted in
reliance on the prior state of the law?; 2. What have been the expectations of
the parties?; 3. Would anyone be harmed by a retroactive decision?

As noted in Amici's Statement of Facts in 2003 as well as herein, in their
negotiations with the Ute and Navajo Tribes which led up to the establishment of the two
Funds filing this brief as Amici, State officials assumed that severance tax collections
would remain at or close to past levels and relied on the fact that a certain amount of
money would be diverted into the two Funds and be available to support significant
projects on or close to the two Indian reservations. A change in the interpretation of the
applicable statute causing the reduction of severance tax collections would disappoint
everyone's expectations and undercut the commitments made. Having to refund severance
taxes by reason of a retroactive decision would create an impossible situation since past
severance taxes received by the Funds have been expended or committed. Having to
renege on commitments made would seriously damage relations between the State and its
two largest Indian tribes.
4.

Would a retroactive decision place a burden on the administration of justice?

A retroactive decision changing the point at which oil and gas production is valued
for severance tax purposes had, and has, the potential of opening the door to refund
claims by dozens of oil and gas producers in the state responsible for the payment of
li

severance taxes. In addition to ExxonMobil, the Appellant in the ExxonMobil case and a
Petitioner herein, two Amici in that case, Conoco Phillips and Chevron Texaco indicated
their interest in the issues involved in the case. There were and are many other potential
refund claimants, large and small, waiting in the wings. Thus the orderly administration of
justice would be clearly be burdened by changing the settled expectations of all parties by
making the decision suddenly retroactive after having applied it prospectively for almost
five years.
5.

Would time be needed by organizations affected by a new interpretation of
the statute to make needed changes?; and, 6.Might a change in the
interpretation of the statute resulting in refund claims negatively affect
budgets and the solvency of governmental entities?

The methodology of calculating severance taxes urged by the Appellant/Petitioner
in 2003 would arguably have reduced the taxes paid to the State and thus, by the statutory
calculation provision (Utah Code Ann. §§59-5-116 and 59-5-119), the amount received by
the two Amici filing this brief The Court may not have wholesale adopted the
Appellant's methodology, but any change in the calculation of severance taxes has the
potential effect of reducing the taxes paid to the State and by extension, the amount
received by the Amici funds.
State budgets are based upon revenue estimates and are required to be balanced.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-38-2(8) (1997). Any reduction in severance tax collections, and
particularly the need to refund taxes collected in the past, has the potential of affecting the
State budget by destroying its balance. Such a reduction could be adjusted for
prospectively but making it retroactive would cause havoc.
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In addition to the overall effect on the State budget, the potential reduction in the
income of the Amici Funds could result in the reopening of negotiations with the two
Indian tribes involved and the entering into of new agreements. A requirement that funds
be disgorged to satisfy severance tax refund claims would create an impossible situation
and disturb expectations resulting from the past approval of projects for funding. Clearly
time would be needed to adapt to any such prospective change and avoid catastrophic
I

budget and solvency problems.
I

I

I

Petitioner asserts, on page 28 of its brief, that this Court "ignored the fact that the
only time the amici fiinds would be impacted was when the wells were actually located on
Indian lands". Amici explained in their 2003 brief, and again in this brief on page 2, that
"a portion of the severance taxes collected by the State from oil and gas production on
Tribal trust lands" [emphasis added], was the negotiated source of revenue for the Funds
which were established to support revitalization projects.
Additionally, on page 28 of its brief Petitioner asserts that the Court's policy
considerations which led to its decision to apply the prospective relief limitation "was
based on the misapprehension of certain facts" and that the application of the Court's
"decision would not have impacted 'other small governmental entities' because, with the
exception of the severance taxes allocated to the amici funds, all of the remaining taxes are
remitted to the State's General Fund". Further on page 44 of its brief Petitioner asserts
that the Court's concern for "other relatively small governmental entities was misplaced"
stating categorically, "thus there were no other small governmental entities which could
I

i

have been negatively impacted by the Court's decision". As demonstrated below these
13

two statements are not accurate. There is a small governmental entity whose funding,
which comes from a restricted account in the General Fund, would be negatively impacted.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-14 states:
(1) (a) There is levied a fee as provided in subsection (l)(b) for oil and
gas:
(i) produced; and
(ii) (A) saved;
(B) sold; or
(C) transported from the field in Utah where the oil and gas is produced,
(b) the fee imposed under subsection (1) is equal to the product of:
(i) .002; and
(ii) the value of the oil or gas determined in accordance with §
59-5-103.1.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-14.5 states:
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted account known
as the Oil and Gas Conservation Account.
(2) The contents of the account shall consist of:
(a) Revenues from the fee levied under section 40-6-14, including any
penalties or interest charged for delinquent payments; and
(b) interest and earnings on account monies.
(3) Account monies shall be used to pay for the:
(a) administration of this chapter; and
(b) plugging and reclamation of abandoned oil wells or bore, core, or
exploratory holes for which:
(i) there is no reclamation surety; or
(ii) the forfeited surety is insufficient for plugging and reclamation... .
Therefore, the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining depends on the fee created in 406-14 and the oil and gas conservation account created in 40-6-14.5 for the "administration
of this chapter." 'This chapter" is 40-6 the Board and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining.
Section 40-6-4 creates the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining and provides for the payment of
their expenses in administering chapter 6 through the fee created in 40-6-14. That fee is
14

specifically tied to valuation as determined under § 59-5-103.1. That statute was central to
the valuation question in ExxonMobil. The determination of valuation under § 59-5-103.1
would directly impact the conservation fee created under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-14 and
the ability of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining to pay its expenses for the
administration of that chapter.
Therefore, the statement that there were no "other small governmental entities that
i

could be impacted by the decision" is simply not true. To represent that the Court was
I
I
"misinformed" regarding the existence and the funding source for the Funds is also not
accurate.
Petitioner's argument that the case of Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91,
requires the Court to reverse it's prior decision as reversible error is without foundation.
Petitioner appears to argue that because Amici was the first to raise the ability of the Court
to limit it's holding to a prospective application, the Court "did not have the benefit from
the focus and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts". But the
I

i
i

issues which required the focus and refinement were actually litigated in the lower courts,
those issues being how to calculate the severance taxes assessed on oil and gas
exploration.
Amici simply reminded the Court of the precedential line of cases, some relating
specifically to taxing disputes, wherein the Court had applied it's ultimate ruling in a
limited manner due to the equities of the situation. Amici presented accounting
information to the Court identifying the revenue received by the funds and how that
i

revenue had been expended or committed to illustrate Amici's concern that a decision
15

requiring the Funds to refiind the money received from the severance taxes could create
significant hardship, if not an fiscal impossibility on the Funds. There was no
misstatement of facts nor any intentional exaggeration of solvency concerns as asserted by
Petitioner in footnote 18 on page 43 of its brief The accounting illustrated for the Court
the revenue that had been received by the Funds and how that revenue had been allocated
by the Funds.
The facts were the facts and the law was the law. Amici didn't assert a novel
theory of law, the law of prospective limitation already existed and had been fully vetted
and applied by this Court for a number of years prior to ExxonMobil. Because neither
Appellant/Petitioner, the Tax Commission, nor other Amici oil and gas companies raised
the ability to apply a decision prospectively does not mean that the Court should have
ignored Amici's argument that prospective application of its decision was appropriate.
B,

Facts subsequent to the Court's decision in EXXONMOBIL
are irrelevant in determining the correctness of the Court's
prior decision.

Petitioner asserts that facts subsequent to the Court's prior ruling clearly indicate
that the Court's ruling was in error. However, that position by Petitioner begs the
question. It is impossible to know what the subsequent facts would have been had the
Court decided to apply it's decision retroactively. Was it the Court's decision that created
the facts subsequent to it's decision or would those same subsequent facts exist without
that decision?
Had the Court not ruled to apply it's decision in a selectively prospective manner
the subsequent facts and events could have been very different. The other oil and gas
16

Amici which had filed for refunds may have pursued those refunds. Other oil and gas
producers who did not file because of the Court's ruling on prospective application may
have filed refund claims. Had the ruling been retroactive and had all refund claims been
pursued, the impact of just such a course of events was exactly what was postured by
Amici in 2003. That concern was one of the policy considerations reasonably relied on by
the Couit.
The Court, based on its own precedents, weighed the equities and reasonable
policy considerations presented and, based on the facts existing at the time, concluded that
its decision should be applied prospectively. One thing is clear, that all interested parties,
Petitioners, other oil and gas producers, the Oil and Gas Conservation Fund, Amici Funds,
the Tax Commission and the State of Utah have relied on the Court's prior decision.
Petitioners have failed to show that decision by the Court was clearly erroneous.
Therefore the Court should decline to upset all parties settled expectations by reversing its
prior holding.
CONCLUSION
The Amici Funds respectfully requests that the Court sustain the Funds' reliance
upon the Court's prior decision.

Since the issuance of the ExxonMobil decision in
l

November 2004 the Revitalization Funds have relied upon the Court's holding that its
decision in that instance "would apply prospectively only." In reliance on that decision the
Funds have continued to plan and commit for expenditures based upon the revenue stream
projected. The Amici Funds have relied upon the Court's statement in making
I

i

commitments and upon the expectation that projected revenue streams would not be
17

adversely impacted by refund requests made in reliance on the prior decision. That settled
reliance should not be upset by the Courts now reversing its own decision.
Dated t h i s S j ^ d a y of July, 2009.
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